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1. Introduction 
 
The recent emergence of analytic theology appears to have rekindled interest 
in the age-old question of what exactly it is that distinguishes the intellectual 
disciplines of theology and philosophy from one another.1 And it’s no surprise that it 
has done so. After all, analytic theology is at present practiced mostly by analytic 
philosophers of religion who have begun turning their focus towards a cluster of 
topics that were traditionally the preserve of systematic theologians: trinity, 
incarnation, atonement, resurrection, sin, grace, the Holy Spirit, the church, the 
sacraments, and so on. It makes sense that these philosophers trained in the analytic 
tradition should pause to wonder whether they might in fact be entering terrain that 
is fundamentally different in some way from that with which they had previously 
been familiar. Indeed, although analytic theology is often seen as an outgrowth of 
analytic philosophy of religion, it isn’t fully clear to what extent it might differ from 
analytic philosophy of religion in some important way. Those conventional 
theologians who are presently wary of analytic theology may worry that it is really no 
different at all from analytic philosophy of religion. Are they right? Is analytic 
theology really just a sub-field of analytic philosophy of religion? This is a pressing 
question indeed for the burgeoning field of analytic theology. The aim of this article, 
then, will be to map out several forms that analytic theology might (and in some cases 
actually does) take before examining the extent to which each can be thought to be 
distinct from analytic philosophy of religion.  
 
                                                
1 See, for instance, Wood (2014), Stump (2013), Abraham (2013), Wolterstorff (2009), Chignell 
(2009). 
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2. What is analytic philosophy of religion? 
 
Before proceeding any further it will be helpful if we can offer at least a rough 
characterization of analytic philosophy of religion. There are several dimensions along 
which we might try to characterize the discipline, including its methodology, its 
subject matter, and its historical development as an intellectual tradition. Beginning 
with the last of these, the rise of analytic philosophy of religion is really an innovation 
of the latter half of the twentieth century. It began to take root in the wake of the 
widespread abandonment of the strongly anti-metaphysical doctrine of logical 
positivism around the middle of the twentieth century, and the growth of analytic 
philosophy of religion as a field was subsequently catalysed by several crucial 
developments in analytic metaphysics and epistemology in the ensuing decades.2 
Some of the most notable of these include the development of possible world 
semantics as a heuristic for investigating necessity and possibility, the recognition of 
the category of metaphysical necessity and possibility as distinct from strict logical 
necessity and possibility, the refutation of the traditional tripartite account of 
knowledge by Gettier’s cases and the subsequent rise of externalist accounts of 
knowledge according to which knowledge can be had in the absence of evidence or 
reasons as traditionally construed, and the application of formal approaches to 
epistemology which make use of Bayesian probabilistic conditionalization and 
decision theory. As an intellectual tradition, analytic philosophy of religion can also be 
characterized in terms of the relation of its practitioners to the great thinkers of the 
past. The typical approach taken by analytic philosophers in this regard is to look to 
the writings of historical thinkers primarily as a source of arguments and theories that 
can be translated into an analytic idiom and used to advance contemporary debates. 
Historical figures upon whom analytic philosophers of religion tend to draw in this 
fashion include medievals such as Anselm, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Ockham, as 
well as thinkers of the early modern period such as Descartes, Hume, Reid, Kant, and 
Leibniz. 
At the level of methodology, analytic philosophy of religion can be seen as 
basically applied analytic metaphysics and epistemology.3 As such it employs the 
following sorts of methods: thought experiments and intuition pumps; reasoning by 
                                                
2 For a fuller historical account of the rise of analytic philosophy of religion, see Wolterstorff (2009). 
3 Recent accounts of the methodology of analytic metaphysics and epistemology can be found in 
Williamson (2007), Rea (2009a), and van Inwagen (2006b). 
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analogy; attempting to achieve reflective equilibrium between intuitions and 
theoretical principles; offering analyses in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; 
refining analyses and principles by way of counterexample (also known as 
‘Chisholming’); appealing to theoretical devices such as possible worlds and sets; using 
probabilistic frameworks such as Bayesian confirmation theory and formal languages 
such as predicate logic and modal logic in order both to state arguments with 
precision and to examine the consequences of philosophical theories; appealing to 
explanatory virtues such as simplicity, elegance, explanatory power as a guide to 
theory-choice; and where appropriate, appealing to philosophically relevant portions 
of well-established scientific theories. Analytic philosophy of religion can also be seen 
to share with analytic metaphysics and epistemology a set of stylistic aspirations, most 
notably, a striving to state arguments and theories in a maximally precise form and to 
use words in their everyday senses except in the case of technical terms that are given 
explicit definitions, where those definitions are expected ultimately to bottom out in 
well-understood terms used in their everyday senses.  
Importantly, the foregoing characterization of the methodology of analytic 
philosophy of religion is based simply on observations about the methods that are 
employed in what I take to be paradigm examples of works of analytic philosophy of 
religion, such as Richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God (2004), Alvin Plantinga’s 
Warranted Christian Belief (2000), Peter van Inwagen’s The Problem of Evil (2006a), 
William Alston’s Perceiving God (1991), Brian Leftow’s Time and Eternity (1991), J.L. 
Mackie’s The Miracle of Theism (1982), and so on. I certainly don’t mean to claim 
that the methodology just sketched can be derived a priori from some eternal essence 
of analytic philosophy of religion. 
As for its subject matter, I think we can fairly easily circumscribe the range of 
questions and topics that fall within the remit of analytic philosophy of religion. 
George Bealer (1998: 203-204) has suggested that analytic philosophy studies those 
subject matters that are characterised by three especially noteworthy features: 
universality, generality, and necessity. That is, it addresses those questions which are 
universal in the sense that they are of relevance to rational creatures regardless of their 
historical and social circumstances, which are general in the sense that they don’t 
pertain to particular individuals or events, and which call for answers that are true of 
necessity. Analytic philosophy of religion, then, is the branch of analytic philosophy 
that treats questions which are of this character and which concern religiously 
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significant topics such as God, the afterlife, religious belief, faith, religious experience, 
and so on.4 
 
 
3. Where to look for differences 
 
I suggested earlier that analytic theology might be seen as an outgrowth of 
analytic philosophy of religion, and I suspect that many would concur with this 
characterisation. One way to read this remark is as a comment on the historical 
lineage of analytic theology as an intellectual tradition. But can analytic theology be 
distinguished from analytic philosophy of religion with respect to its character as an 
intellectual tradition? Well, just as those descendants of Europeans who migrated to 
North America gradually formed a cultural identity which is now markedly different 
from that of Europe, it may be that analytic theology will eventually come to 
constitute a decidedly distinct intellectual tradition from its forebear, but I would 
suggest that that stage has not yet been reached. The overlap between the practitioners 
of the two is very large at present and hence they can scarcely be said to constitute 
distinct intellectual communities, but besides, analytic theology hasn’t yet had time to 
develop a substantial written corpus of its own, the having of which is plausibly an 
essential part of something’s being an intellectual tradition. 
Another place to look for deep differences is at the level of subject matter. It 
has been suggested that the distinction between analytic philosophy of religion and 
analytic theology can be drawn in this way.5 Specifically, the idea is that analytic 
philosophy of religion investigates questions pertaining to theism in general, whereas 
analytic theology investigates those questions that pertain to claims about God which 
are found in the Christian religious tradition in particular. I am dubious about this as 
a way of getting a handle on what really sets the two disciplines apart, however. For 
one thing, if the idea here is that analytic philosophy of religion deals with religious 
ideas and propositions which are tradition-transcending (i.e. which are accepted by 
                                                
4 One might wonder if some of the questions treated by analytic philosophy of religion really fit 
Bealer’s characterisation. For instance, analytic philosophy of religion deals with the question of 
whether this world is the product of a supernatural creator, and whether the amounts and kinds of evil 
found in this world are compatible with the existence of a loving God. I think it can be seen, however, 
that these questions do have a perfectly general form: they are questions about whether it is possible or 
probable that a deity of some description should co-exist with certain types of states of affairs. 
5 See, for instance, Plantinga (1992: 291). Plantinga here talks about ‘philosophical theology’ rather 
than ‘analytic theology’. As far as I can tell analytic theology just is analytic philosophical theology, but 
in any case, what Plantinga says about the former seems fully applicable to the latter in this regard. 
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more-or-less all religious traditions), then it is far from clear that analytic philosophy 
of religion actually conforms to this ideal. Rather, the focus in practice is largely upon 
Anselmian perfect-being theism and Abrahamic monotheism, which are not views 
that are held by all or almost all religious traditions. For another thing, there really 
seems to be no principled reason for saying that theories or claims about divinity 
which are found only in certain traditions lie beyond the investigative remit of 
analytic philosophy of religion. The fact that a given claim has been believed only by 
some cultures or traditions should have no bearing on whether the claim in question 
is a fit object for investigation by analytic philosophers of religion. All that should 
matter is whether the claim in question would constitute an answer to what is 
recognizably a philosophical question—a question such as ‘What properties must a 
divine being have?’ or ‘What sort of afterlife ought we to desire?’. 
 
 
4. Differences in methodology?—The appeal to scripture and 
tradition 
 
Having rejected ways of distinguishing analytic theology and analytic philosophy of 
religion which appeal to supposed differences in their identities as intellectual 
traditions and in their subject matters, we now turn to what I take to be the most 
interesting respect in which we might try to distinguish the two, namely, 
methodology. Now, I take it that the reason that analytic theology is called analytic 
theology is that it aspires to make use of those analytic philosophical methods to 
which I alluded in my earlier characterisation of analytic philosophy of religion. At 
the same time, isn’t it the case that analytic theology additionally employs a certain 
method that analytic philosophy of religion does not and cannot, namely, appealing to 
scripture and ecclesial tradition? Historically, of course, a very influential thought 
about what distinguishes theology from philosophy at the level of methodology has 
been that theology involves such appeals whereas philosophy doesn’t—philosophy 
appeals to reason alone.6 Andrew Chignell echoes this thought in a recent piece: 
 
                                                
6 Aquinas appears to invoke this idea in the following passage: “Sciences are differentiated according to 
the various means through which knowledge is obtained... in order that the salvation of men might be 
brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by 
divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there 
should be a sacred science learned through revelation.” (Aquinas 1981 [1273]: I.I.I) 
6 
Philosophy of religion involves arguments about religiously pertinent 
philosophical issues, of course, but these arguments are customarily 
constructed in such a way that, ideally, anyone will be able to feel their 
probative force on the basis of ‘reason alone’. Analytic theology, by contrast, 
appeals to sources of topics and evidence that go well beyond our collective 
heritage as rational beings with the standard complement of cognitive 
faculties (2009: 119).  
 
I concur with Chignell that this is the right place to look for fundamental differences, 
but more needs to be said about exactly what might be involved in appealing to 
scripture and tradition. In fact, I can think of at least three distinct activities that 
could be denoted by the phrase ‘appealing to scripture and tradition’, namely: (i) 
looking to scripture or ecclesial tradition as a source of topics for investigation; (ii) 
citing claims made by scripture or ecclesial tradition in order to try to demonstrate 
what is entailed by Christian theism; (iii) using a claim asserted by scripture or 
ecclesial tradition as a premise in an argument. 
I should note that ‘a premise in an argument’, as I intend the notion here, 
need not be something so formal as a numbered step in a deductive syllogism, 
although it includes that sort of thing. Rather, I mean the notion of a premise to 
apply to any proposition that is offered by a writer as a reason in support of a distinct 
proposition that he or she is seeking to establish. I should now like to say quite a bit 
more about the various ways in which one might treat scriptural or tradition-based 
claims as premises.  
When a writer uses a certain claim p as a premise in an argument, she may or 
may not have anything further to say by way of argument in favour of p. It is typical 
for analytic philosophers to seek to defend at least those premises of their arguments 
which they take to be controversial among their peers. Of course, an argument offered 
in favour of a given premise will itself employ premises, and one cannot go on forever 
arguing for the premises of the argument for the premises of one’s argument and for 
the premises of the argument for the premises of the argument for the premises of 
one’s argument and so on; one must stop somewhere. We can make a distinction, 
then, between two sorts of premise. On the one hand there is what we might call a 
foundational premise, on behalf of which no further argumentation is offered, and on 
the other hand there is what we might call an intermediate premise, which is a premise 
on behalf of which further argumentation is offered. The chain of reasoning offered in 
support of any intermediate premise will of course eventually terminate in 
foundational premises. We can thus distinguish between approaches that treat 
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scriptural or tradition-based claims as foundational premises and approaches that treat 
such claims as intermediate premises. 
Let’s consider further those approaches that treat scriptural or tradition-based 
claims as intermediate premises. There is an important difference between using a 
proposition p that is asserted by scripture or ecclesial tradition as an intermediate 
premise whilst arguing for the truth of the particular claim at issue (i.e., p), and using a 
proposition p that is asserted by scripture or ecclesial tradition as an intermediate 
premise whilst arguing that scripture or tradition are generally trustworthy sources, 
without arguing for p in particular. To illustrate the difference, suppose that an 
analytic theologian writes a paper in which ten separate scriptural claims are used as 
premises at various points in the paper, and suppose further that she intends to treat 
these scriptural claims as intermediate rather than foundational premises. On the one 
hand, our analytic theologian might try to offer separate arguments for the truth of 
each of these ten scriptural claims. On the other hand, she might just offer a general 
argument for thinking that scripture as a whole is reliable, without trying to offer 
arguments on behalf of each individual scriptural claim of which she makes use.  
Presumably the former is a much more onerous task than the latter. 
I take it that we can further distinguish two sub-varieties of the former 
approach: there are approaches that seek to argue for particular scriptural or tradition-
based claims in a way that doesn’t assume the truth of scripture or tradition, and there 
are approaches which argue for particular scriptural or tradition-based claims in a 
manner that does ultimately assume the truth of some other scriptural or tradition-
based claims. As for the latter approach, presumably if one is assuming the truth of 
certain scriptural passages in order to argue for the trustworthiness of other scriptural 
passages, then one will be looking only to assume scriptural passages that are widely 
accepted by one’s target audience in order to argue for the truth of (a certain 
interpretation of) a passage which is more controversial among that audience.7 
As for arguing for the general trustworthiness of scripture or tradition, again 
we can distinguish various distinct ways of going about such a task. Firstly, we can 
distinguish between epistemically circular and non-circular ways of arguing for the 
trustworthiness of scripture or tradition. To illustrate what I mean by ‘epistemic 
circularity’ in this context, consider the following example. Suppose that I am 
challenged by a Humean sceptic to demonstrate that my visual faculties are 
trustworthy, and suppose that in order to try to meet this challenge I appeal to various 
sources such as the results of my optometric tests, physicians’ reports, as well as more 
                                                
7 N.T. Wright seems to take something like this approach in chapter 7 of Borg and Wright (2000). 
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general scientific accounts of the workings of human visual perception. Of course, if 
pressed by the sceptic on how I know that these sources are trustworthy, I will 
eventually have to appeal to things that I take myself to know via my visual 
perception, and in that sense my defence of the trustworthiness of my visual faculties 
is epistemically circular. It’s worth noting that some epistemologists think that this 
sort of circularity can be perfectly acceptable, perhaps even epistemically virtuous.8 So, 
one way to defend the general trustworthiness of scripture or tradition is to do so in 
an epistemically circular manner; that is, to tell a story about why we should trust 
scripture or tradition but in a way that eventually appeals to claims made by scripture 
or tradition. Here would be an example of such a story: The Gospel narrative which is 
at the heart of Christian scripture—of God becoming human and dying so as to make 
humankind right with God—resonates at a deep level with our sense of what might 
be termed ‘narrative fittingness’. Moreover, the reason that this sense should be 
trusted as a guide to the ultimate truth of things is that scripture gives us reason to 
think that God would create us with just such a sense.  
How might one tell an epistemically non-circular story about the 
trustworthiness of scripture or tradition? Well, one way would be to mount a kind of 
inductive argument which goes something like this: There is a range of scriptural or 
tradition-based claims each of which can be independently verified—for instance, by 
way of archaeological discoveries or corroboration by extra-Biblical textual sources—
and since scripture has got it right in these instances we may infer that it has probably 
also got it right about those of its claims that are hard or impossible to verify in a 
similar manner. A problem with a popular way of running this sort of argument is 
that it isn’t really clear that it is legitimate to infer the trustworthiness of the Bible on 
all or most topics about which it makes assertions (including metaphysical-doctrinal 
matters) from the fact that it can be independently shown to be accurate on a certain 
relatively narrow range of topics such as place names, broad chronology, the existence 
of certain key figures such as Jesus and St Paul, and so on. A different approach would 
be to argue for the truth of one or two particularly important doctrines—say, the 
Resurrection and the Incarnation—and do so without presupposing the 
trustworthiness of the Bible, and then go on to argue that the truth of these particular 
doctrines entails or makes it very probable that the Bible as a whole (or at least, the 
most theologically significant portions thereof) is trustworthy. Yet another approach 
would be to appeal to a priori intuitions about what God would be likely to do vis-a-
vis communicating with human beings. One might try to argue that it is a priori 
                                                
8 See, for example, Sosa (2009), Van Cleve (2003), and Alston (1986). 
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probable that God would reveal himself to humans in something like the way that the 
Bible claims he has done: by becoming incarnate at a particularly religiously poignant 
place and time in human history and by acting self-sacrificially so as to atone for 
human sin. 
For convenience, the foregoing distinctions are set out below:  
 
 
5. More and less philosophical forms of analytic theology 
 
Having catalogued fairly extensively the range of possibilities for how one 
might ‘appeal to’ scripture and tradition, we should be better positioned to get clear 
on how various possible forms of analytic theology may or may not differ from 
analytic philosophy of religion at the level of methodology. At this point it may be 
helpful, where possible, to point to some concrete examples of each of the forms of 
analytic theology identified.  
Let’s first consider a form of analytic theology that appeals to scripture only in 
way (1). This sort of analytic theology looks to the scriptures and Christian tradition 
…and arguing for the truth of the 
particular scriptural or tradition-
based claim at issue… 
…and arguing that 
scripture or tradition are 
generally trustworthy…  
…in a manner that doesn’t 
in any way assume the 
truth of scriptural or 
tradition-based claims. (4) 
…in a manner that 
assumes some other 
scriptural or tradition-
based claims. (5) 
 …where that premise is treated 
as foundational. (3) 
…where that premise is 
treated as intermediate… 
Looking to scripture or 
ecclesial tradition as a source 
of topics for investigation. (1) 
Citing claims made by scripture or 
ecclesial tradition in order to try to show 
what is entailed by Christian theism. (2) 
Using a claim that is asserted by 
scripture or ecclesial tradition as a 
premise in an argument… 
…in an epistemically 
non-circular manner. 
(6) 
…in an epistemically 
circular manner. (7) 
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for interesting topics, but in treating those topics employs only the methods of 
analytic philosophy of religion sketched earlier. This form of analytic theology really is 
a sub-field of analytic philosophy of religion, since the only possible reason for calling 
it ‘theology’ is its subject matter—namely, those doctrines that are peculiar to the 
Christian tradition—and I argued that the subject matter of analytic philosophy of 
religion does in fact encompass the examination of religious claims that are made only 
by some religious traditions rather than by all. An excellent example of approach (1) is 
David Lewis’s article ‘Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?’ (1997). Lewis here is 
simply using the fact that significant portions of the Christian theological tradition 
affirms the doctrine of penal substitution as an occasion to discuss the question of 
whether it is ever possible for one person to absorb another person’s guilt. There is 
clearly no sense in which Lewis relies upon scriptural claims in order to justify the 
conclusions he draws; rather, those conclusions are arrived at solely via the methods of 
thought experiment and conceptual analysis. 
How about a form of analytic theology that appeals to scripture and tradition 
only in way (2)? I am inclined to think that this too would really be a sub-field of 
analytic philosophy of religion. Again, subject matter alone is not sufficient to 
distinguish a given form of analytic theology from analytic philosophy of religion. 
And employing a methodology which involves using those aforementioned analytic 
philosophical tools and appealing to scriptural or tradition-based claims in order to 
draw out the implications of Christian theism does not require one to take any stand 
on the truth or trustworthiness of Christian scripture or tradition. In essence, this 
form of analytic theology would be about arguing for (or against) conditional 
propositions of the form if Christian theism were true (and hence Christian scripture 
trustworthy) then p.9  It is a point of elementary logic that one can endorse the 
conditional proposition if A then B without being committed one way or the other on 
the question of whether A is true. In citing scriptural passages in support of 
conditionals of the aforementioned form, one would no more be committed to the 
truth of those passages than would a writer who cited passages from the Sutras in 
arguing for conditionals of the form if Buddhism were true then p. Erik Wielenberg’s 
Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (2005) at various points exemplifies approach 
(2). Wielenberg cites a number of scriptural passages when comparing the 
understanding of humility that he sees as flowing from the Biblical worldview with his 
own preferred secular conception of humility, ultimately arguing that the latter, even 
though lacking God as its point of reference, is still sufficiently robust to motivate 
                                                
9 I mean to include here conditionals of the form if Christian theism were true then possibly p. 
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charity towards others. Wielenberg seeks only to show what Christian theism is 
committed to when it comes to the topic of humility; he has no need at all to 
presuppose the truth of the scriptural passages he cites.  
One sort of project that is frequently carried out under the banner of analytic 
theology involves taking an important doctrinal claim as formulated in the creeds—
the Trinity and Incarnation, say—and seeking to present a logically coherent model 
of that doctrine, the ultimate aim being to demonstrate that contrary to the critics’ 
accusations the doctrine in question is not an impossibility. Several examples of this 
sort of undertaking can be found in Volume 1 of Oxford Readings in Philosophical 
Theology (Rea 2009b). Peter van Inwagen, for instance, begins his essay in that 
volume in the following way: “I shall try to imagine a way of stating the doctrine of 
the Trinity that has the following feature: when the doctrine is stated in this way, it 
can be shown not to be self-contradictory” (2009: 61). Where does this sort of project 
fit into my taxonomy? I am tempted to say that it exemplifies approach (2). The 
author is concerned to describe a model, a set of propositions, which both entails the 
doctrinal claim that the author ascribes to the Christian theological tradition—in this 
case, the claim that God exists in three persons—and seems clearly to be 
metaphysically possible. Since p entails q and possibly p taken together entail possibly q, 
the author, if successful, will have demonstrated the metaphysical possibility of the 
three-in-one claim. Insofar as any mention of scriptural passages or creedal 
affirmations is made in undertaking such a task, as far as I can see it really serves only 
the purpose of illustrating what it is that orthodox Christianity is committed to—for 
instance, the claim that God is three persons. That is, it seems that references to 
scripture or creedal affirmations are not, in this context, being offered as premises in 
support of the truth (and hence the possible truth) of the doctrinal claim that is under 
consideration; rather, the author has taken it upon him or herself to try to 
demonstrate the possible truth of the doctrinal claim in question by using as premises 
the deliverances only of those sources that secular philosophers will generally regard as 
legitimate.  
Let’s now turn to consider forms of analytic theology that appeal to scripture 
and tradition by using claims found therein as premises in arguments. As is suggested 
by the number of sub-varieties of this approach that I have delineated, it seems to me 
that things become a little more complicated at this point. Before going further, 
though, it’s worth pausing to consider whether there’s actually much of a difference 
between approach (2) and approaches that use scriptural claims as premises. Alvin 
Plantinga has suggested that for any argument that employs scriptural premises, one 
can always employ a counterpart argument which remains neutral on the truth of the 
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scriptural claims at issue and instead aims for a merely conditional conclusion 
concerning what would follow if those scriptural claims were true (i.e. exactly the sort 
of conclusion which I said approach (2) seeks to establish). He describes an approach 
he calls ‘conditionalization’ wherein  
 
Instead of addressing a given question, ‘What is the best way to think about 
x, employing all that you know including what you know by faith?’ you 
address instead the question ‘What would be the best way to think about x, 
if in fact the deliverances of the faith were true?’ This question can be 
approached Duhemianly (or Spinozistically), using only beliefs that are 
among the deliverances of reason; no theological assumptions or or 
deliverances of faith need be involved… Your results can be displayed as a 
conditional if F, then P; where F represents the deliverances of faith (2000: 
419). 
 
Plantinga is clearly right in what he says here, but it would be a mistake to suppose 
that just because one can very easily switch from an approach that treats scriptural 
claims as premises to an approach that merely considers what would follow if those 
scriptural claims were true (irrespective of whether they are true)—i.e., approach 
(2)—that there is therefore no significant difference between these two sorts of 
approach. Consider that if the conclusion of one’s argument is merely a conditional of 
the form if Christian scripture were trustworthy then p, then one won’t, on the basis of 
such an argument, be entitled to believe p. By contrast, if one’s argument combines a 
conditional of the form if Christian scripture were true then p with the premise that 
Christian scripture (or at least the relevant portion thereof) is true, then provided one is 
entitled to that premise—and approaches (4), (5), (6), and (7) take different stances 
on whether and in what manner one needs to argue for that premise—one will be 
entitled on the basis of one’s argument to believe p. And that is surely a very 
important difference. A fully fledged Christian faith cannot consist merely in 
believing conditionals of the aforementioned sort; it presumably also involves 
believing the consequents of at least some such conditionals. 
 We can now turn to consider those approaches which don’t merely 
conditionalize but which argue from premises which include scriptural claims. Let’s 
start with what seems to be the easiest judgment call, namely, whether a form of 
analytic theology that appeals to scripture and tradition in way (3) is distinct from 
analytic philosophy of religion at the level of methodology. The answer seems to be a 
clear ‘yes’. To treat Christian scripture and tradition as epistemologically foundational 
is certainly to part ways with the methodology of analytic philosophy of religion. But 
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why exactly is that? The reason, I suspect, has to do with the overarching aspirations 
of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy, including analytic philosophy of religion, 
aspires to a certain kind of universality: analytic philosophy, I take it, is supposed to 
be the kind of activity that any sufficiently intelligent rational creature in any possible 
world could (at least in principle) engage in, given the right sort of training, and so 
on. 10  Given this, any epistemic source which analytic philosophy treats as 
foundational ought to be such that it is in principle available to just about any 
sufficiently intelligent rational creature. But divine revelation is by its very nature not 
part of the natural cognitive endowment of any finite rational creature, and for that 
reason it cannot be treated as a foundational epistemic source by an analytic 
philosopher qua analytic philosopher. It seems, then, that a form of analytic theology 
that appeals to scripture and tradition in way (3) is clearly distinguished by virtue of 
its methodology from analytic philosophy of religion. Notably Karl Barth held that it 
is proper to treat scripture as a source whose trustworthiness need not and indeed 
should not be established by reference to some allegedly more basic epistemic source—
hence his passionate opposition to the project of natural theology. Barth cannot 
rightly be thought of as a practitioner of any form of analytic theology,11 but an 
approach which takes a broadly Barthian attitude to the status of scripture as an 
epistemic source and combines it with the use of the analytic tools described earlier 
would exemplify approach (3).  
We now come to what I take to be the somewhat trickier questions of whether 
forms of analytic theology that use scriptural or tradition-based claims as intermediate 
premises are distinct from analytic philosophy of religion at the level of methodology. 
To use scriptural or tradition-based claims as intermediate premises is to cite them in 
support of one’s conclusions whilst also attempting to offer some kind of reasoned 
justification for one’s employment of scripture or tradition, and this seems on the face 
of it to be a step in the direction of analytic philosophy of religion. But how big a 
step? As a guiding principle here, I would suggest that the more that a form of 
analytic theology attempts to make scripture and tradition answerable to those 
philosophically-approved cognitive faculties which are available to more-or-less any 
sufficiently intelligent rational creature—empirical observation, induction, inference 
                                                
10 Again, see Bealer (1998: 203-204). 
11 As Oliver Crisp writes, “It is more difficult to see how a Barth‐like method might be analytic. His 
whole approach to theology, as John Webster suggests, is much more like a fugue that uses variations 
on a theme in different parts of the work to make sense of a theological topic” (2009: 46).  
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to the best explanation, a priori intuition, and so on—the more closely it will 
resemble analytic philosophy of religion at the level of methodology.    
Of the four ways of using scripture and tradition as intermediate premises that 
I have identified, (4) seems to be the closest methodologically to analytic philosophy 
of religion. This approach singles out particular claims made by scripture or tradition 
and seeks to argue for those claims by reference just to the aforementioned sorts of 
cognitive faculties and sources. It isn’t surprising that Christian writers seeking to 
engage in apologetic efforts directed at non-believers—defending the historicity of the 
Resurrection or the Incarnation, for example—tend to approach scripture in just this 
manner for such purposes. Prime examples of this approach are the arguments for the 
historicity of the Resurrection offered by Richard Swinburne (2003) and William 
Lane Craig (1985). Roughly, the strategy of these authors is to argue that a bodily 
resurrection of Jesus is the best explanation for a range of occurrences reported in 
Paul’s epistles and the Gospels, such as the burial of Jesus, the subsequent discovery of 
his tomb empty by his women followers, and the experiences had by the disciples of 
seeming to see Jesus after his death. Further argumentation is offered on behalf of the 
trustworthiness of each of the scriptural passages at issue, and that argumentation 
doesn’t itself assume the trustworthiness of scripture or any portion thereof. 
 Similar remarks apply to (6), which seeks to argue for the trustworthiness of 
scripture and tradition by reference only to such philosophically-approved cognitive 
faculties. The slight difference is that (6) seeks to show that scripture and tradition are 
trustworthy as a whole without engaging in a defence of each and every scriptural or 
tradition-based claim that is being used. In that sense, approach (6) makes those 
sources slightly less answerable to the aforementioned faculties than does approach 
(4).  
Finally, let’s consider approaches (5) and (7). In terms of their resemblance to 
the methodology of analytic philosophy of religion, these two approaches stand 
somewhere in between (3), on the one hand, and (4) and (6), on the other. 
Approaches (5) and (7) both seek to offer some reasoned justification for the use of 
scriptural or tradition-based claims as premises, but the reasoning in question is 
epistemically circular in the sense defined earlier, namely, that such approaches argue 
for the trustworthiness of scripture or tradition (as a whole, in the case of (7); for 
particular claims made therein, in the case of (5)) in a manner that relies in part on 
claims made by those very sources. Now, I noted earlier that some epistemologists 
regard some instances of epistemic circularity as benign and even virtuous. 
Coherentists about epistemic justification, in fact, think that there isn’t an alternative, 
short of radical scepticism, to arguing in a circle for the reliability of any given 
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cognitive faculty or source, since coherentists hold that no cognitive faculty or source 
may be treated as foundational (i.e. as being such that we may employ it without 
having any prior reason to trust it).12 Insofar as it is possible to be epistemically 
justified in trusting a given faculty or source on the basis of epistemically circular 
reasoning, it is intuitively plausible that some circles yield more justification than 
others. In particular, it is plausible that bigger circles are better, other things held 
equal. An argument for trusting scripture which immediately appeals to scriptural 
passages and nothing else—which appeals, for instance, to the Pauline passage 
according to which “All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, 
rebuking, correcting and training in righteousness” (2 Timothy 3: 16-17)—will 
involve a very small justificatory circle—so small, indeed, that it is tempting to see 
such an approach as really treating scripture as epistemologically foundational and 
hence being an instance of approach (3). On the other hand, an argument for the 
trustworthiness of scripture that appeals in the first instance to a variety of 
independent sources—certain aesthetic or moral intuitions or observations about 
human nature, for instance—and only later appeals to scripture or tradition in order 
to argue for the trustworthiness of these independent sources, will yield considerably 
more justification (insofar as epistemically circular reasoning yields justification at all). 
This latter sort of circularity still doesn’t make scripture and tradition fully answerable 
to philosophically-approved sources and so it can be seen to diverge from the 
methodology of analytic philosophy of religion, but not quite as sharply as does a 
form of analytic theology that employs approach (3).  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I hope to have shed a little light in the foregoing remarks on the relationship between 
analytic philosophy of religion and analytic theology. According to my account there 
are in fact several possible forms of analytic theology, each of which differ from one 
another with respect to the epistemological status that they accord to scripture and 
tradition. If I am correct in thinking that the suspicion of some non-analytic 
theologians towards the project of analytic theology has something to do with the 
worry that it isn’t genuinely distinct from analytic philosophy of religion and hence 
isn’t really theology, then it behooves those calling themselves analytic theologians to 
                                                
12 Appropriately, those epistemologists who think that we can employ some cognitive faculties or 
sources without prior reason for trusting them are called ‘foundationalists’. 
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be fully explicit about the epistemological role played by scripture and tradition in 
their methodologies, and hence, about whether or not they are practicing a form of 
analytic theology of which that worry is correct.13  
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